LIVRES

Income Disparity Index 2025

The income distance between the **state elite** and the population in Brazil

Credits

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR **MAGNO KARL**
OPERATIONS DIRECTOR **MANO FERREIRA**
COORDINATION AND EDITING **RAFAEL MOREDO**
GRAPHIC DESIGN **DAVI GALINDO**
RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTION **CAROLINA SILVEIRA, FELIPE KLEN, MANUELA TORRES** AND **MATHEUS ROCHA**
PRODUCTION **SARAH MELO**
TRANSLATION **RAFAEL MOREDO** AND **SARAH MELO**
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About LIVRES

Livres is a civil society association that promotes liberal solutions for Brazil through policy curation, participation in public debate, and leadership development.

eusoulivres.org
@eusoulivres
youtube.com/LIVRES
contato@eusoulivres.org

Magno Karl
Executive director at Livres

The Livres Income Disparity Index (IDI) is a tool designed to rigorously and clearly measure the gap between the salaries of Brazil's state elite and the reality of the population they are meant to represent. In a context of growing distrust in institutions and a perceived distance between representatives and those they represent, the IDI translates this perception into concrete, comparable, and trackable data.

The methodology is simple yet powerful: we compare the gross monthly compensation of public officials — such as mayors, councilors, congresspeople, governors, judges, Supreme Court justices, and the President of the Republic — with the per capita household income of the population under their jurisdiction. The resulting index reveals how far these public officeholders live above (or outside) the social reality of the citizens who elect and fund them.

The IDI covers all federal levels and the three branches of the Republic, and it also provides an international comparison with a sample of 17 countries of different economic, institutional, and regional profiles, including mature democracies and nations with income levels similar to Brazil.

The results are striking: Brazil holds a IDI of 21.27 in the national executive branch, while the average among the other countries analyzed is 10.20. This means Brazil's disparity is approximately 108% higher than the global average — even when compared with countries facing similar income levels, development stages, or institutional challenges.

This finding reinforces that inequality between representatives and the represented in Brazil is not merely a matter of perception or public dissatisfaction — it is a quantifiable, structural reality, and significantly more severe than what is observed in other democracies.

It is also important to highlight that this institutional inequality compounds an already highly unequal structure: Brazil has a Gini coefficient of 0.52, according to the World Bank's Poverty and Inequality Platform (2024), placing it among the most unequal countries in the world. Still, WDI data shows that state elites operate with an even sharper logic of income concentration than the market itself. Instead of offsetting inequality, the formal public sector deepens it — creating a kind of "state Gini" that makes explicit the distance between institutions and society.

This index inaugurates an annual publication series aimed at fostering a more evidence-based debate on the cost of the public sector and the need for reforms that strengthen the legitimacy of institutions and bring them closer to the population.



Methodology

Measuring the **state elite** income disparity

The Income Disparity Index (IDI) by Livres was conceived as a simple and straightforward tool to compare the earnings of the state elite with the average income of the population they represent. It is calculated as the ratio between the average gross monthly income of a public authority (whether an elected official or a senior member of the judiciary) and the per capita household income of the population under their jurisdiction. The higher this ratio, the greater the distance between representatives and the represented.

Access our database

The Disparity Ratio Formula

To ensure methodological rigor and temporal consistency, all calculations were carried out using data from the same base year, preferably 2024, the most recent year with complete information available in official databases. The applied formula is:

$$\text{IDI} = \frac{\text{gross monthly remuneration of the authority}}{\text{per capita household income of the represented population}}$$

The authorities considered include:

- The President of the Republic and federal representatives;
- Governors and state and district representatives;
- Mayors and councilors of the 26 state capitals;
- Justices of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), state and federal judges, and other judicial authorities.

Data Sources

For population income, we used microdata from the Continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNAD Contínua), produced by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The reference indicator was **per capita household income**, which is already widely established as the standard measure for socioeconomic comparisons.

For other countries, we relied on their **respective national statistics agencies** (such as INEGI/Mexico, INDEC/Argentina, ABS/Australia, INE/Spain, and Stats NZ/New Zealand).

The remunerations of public authorities were obtained directly from official sources, such as:

- Official Gazettes of the Union, states, and municipalities;
- Transparency Portals of the respective levels of government;
- Reports from the National Council of Justice (CNJ), in the case of the Judiciary;
- Public statements and official documents released by ministries, presidencies, or parliamentary offices.

In cases where data was not up to date or available in a consolidated format, figures published by media outlets based on official documents were used, provided they were properly cited and cross-verified.

Inflation Adjustment

Not all countries had published 2024 data on per capita household income at the time this index was prepared. To ensure temporal consistency and allow for fair comparisons, incomes reported from previous years (especially 2023 or 2022) were adjusted based on the cumulative inflation between the time of data collection and November 2024, according to each country's official data.

This adjustment was carried out using national consumer price indexes (CPI), obtained through the national statistics agencies of each country and supplemented by data from the World Bank.

The applied formula was:

$$\text{Adjusted income} = \text{base income} \times (1 + \text{cumulative inflation})$$

This procedure ensures that all disparity ratios reflect, with the highest possible accuracy, the real situation of the populations in the study's reference year (2024).

Inclusion of Gini Coefficient

To strengthen the comparative analysis, the study also included the Gini coefficient (World Bank data),

which measures income inequality among individuals in each country. Although there is no causal relationship between the Gini coefficient and the Income Disparity Index (IDI), the comparison between the two allows us to observe the extent to which institutional inequality between representatives and the represented accompanies — or exceeds — the country's social inequality.

This comparison seeks to contextualize the IDI in light of market inequality, making it possible to identify countries where the public sector acts as a reducer of inequality or, conversely, as its reproducer or promoter.

International Comparison

The sample of 17 countries was selected based on economic, institutional, and geographic diversity, considering two main factors:

1. The international market classification adopted by institutions such as MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) and S&P Dow Jones Indices; and
2. The availability of reliable public data on public sector wages and population income.

The countries were grouped into two blocks:

ADVANCED ECONOMIES

- USA
- Germany
- Japan
- Australia
- New Zealand
- Canada
- Portugal
- South Korea
- UK
- Spain
- Switzerland

ADVANCED ECONOMIES

- South Africa
- Chile
- Argentina
- Philippines
- Brazil
- Mexico

Uruguay is not formally part of the indexes, but it was included as an emerging country due to its **compatibility** in institutional and socioeconomic profile.

This composition ensures an international comparison that combines regional and economic diversity with methodological standardization. The international comparison thus functions as an expanded control group.

Analysis Structure

The study is organized into four main sections:

- International comparison: compares the income disparity of Brazilian national authorities with their counterparts in other countries. This stage positions Brazil against international standards.
- State-level disparity ranking: calculates the IDI for governors, state representatives, and federal representatives across all federative units.
- Municipal ranking (state capitals): focuses on the salaries of mayors and councilors in the capitals, compared to the income of the local population.
- Judiciary: analyzes the disparity between the salaries of judges and members of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the average income of the population, both nationally and by state, in addition to an international comparison with the salaries of supreme courts in other countries.

Brazil vs The World

A State Elite Disproportionately **Distant**

The comparison between the Brazilian state elite and national authorities in other countries reveals a scenario of **systemic disparity**, exceeding acceptable limits even when measured against nations with different institutional structures and levels of development.

Unequal even among unequals



How we calculated Brazil's National Executive IDI

R$ 2k
per capita household income

ratio
21,3

R$ 44k
salary of the President of Brazil

108% higher than the global average

32% higher than the developing countries' average

Brazil's Income Disparity Index (IDI) for the National Executive — calculated based on the ratio between the remuneration of the President of the Republic (R$ 44,008.52) and the per capita household income of the population (R$ 2,069.00) — is 21.27. In other words, the head of Brazil's federal executive branch earns more than twenty times the average monthly income of an ordinary citizen in the country.

Brazil stands out negatively even among countries with similar socioeconomic profiles, such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, which present significantly lower indices despite sharing comparable structural challenges, including income concentration, fiscal fragility, and historical inequality. Mexico, on the other hand, while having a high presidential salary, records an IDI only 15.6% higher than Brazil's — despite its average income being 26% lower.

Income inequality



The data demonstrates that high income inequality (a high Gini coefficient) does not in itself determine a high IDI. Chile and Mexico, for example, share the same Gini coefficient (0.43) but display very different IDI results — 10.3 in Chile and 24.6 in Mexico. This indicates that, although Brazil's income inequality is high, the level of public sector income disparity is also the outcome of institutional and political choices, not merely the economic context.

Although the comparison does not allow for causal inference, it suggests that the disconnect of Brazil's state elite exceeds what would be expected based on the society's overall inequality. Rather than correcting distortions, as one would expect from the State, the top tier of the Brazilian public sector reproduces them — and often amplifies them.

By contrast, in developed countries where political salaries are high in nominal terms, the distance relative to the population's average income is much smaller.

The heads of government in Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, for example, earn between five and nine times the national average income. In these countries, Gini coefficients range from 0.32 to 0.41, and the public sector remains within reasonable standards of institutional proportionality. The IDI values, while not negligible, fall within acceptable limits for a governing elite in modern democracies.

A Control Group Highlighting the Disparity

International comparison makes it possible to isolate Brazil's problem and show that there is a deviation — not only in relation to wealthy countries but also to nations facing similar challenges.

When considering only emerging countries with institutional and distributive challenges comparable to Brazil — such as Mexico, Argentina, the Philippines, and South Africa — the average IDI is 16.05. Even so, Brazil, with an index of 21.27, remains substantially higher, indicating that its disparity does not stem solely from adverse economic conditions but from a model of public remuneration detached from social reality.

Federative Inequality

Disparity among Brazilian states



The IDI also shows that income disparity between the state elite and the population is not homogeneous across the national territory.

On the contrary, it reflects a structural pattern of institutional detachment that intensifies in certain regions and manifests itself at all levels of power — in state executive and legislative branches as well as in federal representation.

In this chapter, we compare Brazil's 26 states and the Federal District based on three categories:

- Governors
- State representatives
- Federal representatives

1 Governors:
better paid than heads of state



Indicators • • • Global average 10,2 • • • Prime-minister of Spain 7,1

List of State names and abbreviations in Brazil

AC - Acre
AL - Alagoas
AP - Amapá
AM - Amazonas
BA - Bahia
CE - Ceará
DF - Distrito Federal
ES - Espírito Santo
GO - Goiás
MA - Maranhão
MT - Mato Grosso
MS - Mato Grosso do Sul
MG - Minas Gerais
PA - Pará
PB - Paraíba
PR - Paraná
PE - Pernambuco
PI - Piauí
RJ - Rio de Janeiro
RN - Rio Grande do Norte
RS - Rio Grande do Sul
RO - Rondônia
RR - Roraima
SC - Santa Catarina
SP - São Paulo
SE - Sergipe
TO - Tocantins

All Brazilian governors earn, proportionally, more than the head of government of Spain

The analysis of the IDI for governors reveals an alarming pattern: the lower the population's income, the greater the salary disparity between them and the head of the state executive branch.

The comparison between Bahia, a Brazilian State, and Spain illustrates Brazil's salary gap. Although they have **similar territorial areas**, the IDI of the governor of Bahia is 27.0, almost four times higher than the IDI of the Spanish prime minister (7.1). In fact, all Brazilian governors earn proportionally more than the head of government of Spain.

Even in states with higher average income, such as São Paulo and the Federal District, the disparity between governors' salaries and the population's income remains significant. On the other hand, when compared to international standards — especially among countries with income levels similar to Brazil's — these states present less income disparity, close to or even below the average for emerging countries and aligned with the range observed in consolidated democracies (average of 10.20). These results show that it is possible to move toward more balanced levels of remuneration, as already occurs in part of the country.

Although the index in these states still demonstrates a significant disconnect between governors and the represented population, they stand out positively from the Brazilian pattern and are closer to international parameters considered reasonable. This reinforces that **there is room for structural progress in Brazil**, including by taking as reference the good practices already observed in some federative units, where the remuneration of authorities is moving toward greater institutional balance.

IDS 7
Spain
Area
506.020 km²

IDS 27
BA - Bahia
Area
564.760 km²

Similar areas, great disparities

IDS 6
UK
Area
243.610 km²

IDS 13
SP - São Paulo
Area
248.219 km²

2 State Representatives: a Legislature Replicating Privileges



Regional income inequality raises red flags

Even in Brazil's wealthiest states, the disparity remains high — Paraná, the Federal District, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul all have state deputies earning at least nine times more than the local average income.

Even with small variations across states, salaries range between R$ 33,000 and R$ 35,000. Combined with **regional income inequality**, this generates extremely high disparity indexes in practically every part of the country.

In the states with higher income levels, the gap between representatives and the represented remains large. Paraná, the Federal District, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul have the **lowest disparity indexes** among state representatives, but even there, legislative salaries are more than nine times higher than the average income of the local population.

State representatives have higher IDI than heads of government in some developed countries.

This pattern is particularly revealing when we place the data in an **international perspective**. In Portugal, the president has an IDI of 9.16; in Spain, the prime minister's IDI is 7.10; and in the United Kingdom, the prime minister's IDI is around 6.33.



IDI of State Representatives across Brazil

The highest indexes are concentrated in the North and Northeast regions.

- **Highest IDI** 31
- 28
- 9,6
- **Lowest IDI** 9,5

3 Federal Representatives: standardized salaries mask regional inequality



International Comparison

IDI of federal representatives in other countries:

The case of federal deputies is paradigmatic. Since they all receive the **same fixed national salary (R$ 44,008.52)**, variations in the IDI across states reflect exclusively the differences in local population income. The data show that, even with a standardized value, the distributive effect is profoundly unequal

This salary standardization, without considering regional income differences, amplifies inequality and distorts federative representation. The **same salary has a much greater impact in poorer states**, where the IDI of federal deputies can exceed 40 times the local average income. In practice, this creates disproportionate privileges, undermines the notion of federative balance, and deepens the sense of distance between Brasília and the reality of voters.

Brazilian federal representatives earn up to 40 times the average local income.

Moreover, when comparing Brazilian federal deputies with their counterparts in **other countries**, the contrast becomes even more striking. While in Brazil the average IDI for federal representatives is 21.27, in consolidated democracies these figures are much lower, ranging between **three and five times the population's average income.**

In other words, in mature democracies and even in countries with comparable institutional challenges, such as Argentina, the pattern is a gap between representatives and the represented that is **three to seven times smaller than in Brazil**. This demonstrates that Brazil's disproportion is not merely a consequence of low national income, but above all the result of a public remuneration model disconnected from the population's economic reality.

Regional modulation reduces distortions

The data reveal a **structural inequality of the Brazilian State**, reproduced in all regions and at all levels of power. Even in contexts of scarce resources, fiscal crisis, or widespread poverty, political elites' salaries remain high, with little or no correlation to the local socioeconomic reality.

Given this scenario, it is urgent to debate the adoption of **salary modulation mechanisms linked to local reality** — whether through proportional ceilings, regional indexers, or legal limits based on social indicators. The goal is not to devalue public service, but to recalibrate its legitimacy and bring it closer to the people it serves.

R$ 44,000

Standard salary of federal representatives in all states

PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME

R$ 1,000

Maranhão (MA): per capita household three times lower than the Federal District, yet deputies in both states receive the same salary.

R$ 3,000

Disparities in Brazil's Capitals

When the municipal elite lives in another reality

The municipal section of the IDI deepens the finding that Brazil's state elite, even at the levels closest to the citizen, lives in material realities radically distant from the population. The survey of Brazil's 27 capitals reveals sharp disparities in both the Legislative branch (city councilors) and the Executive branch (mayors), reinforcing the **local dimension of institutional inequality**.

The methodology followed the same standard applied to other federal levels: the ratio between the gross monthly salary of the authority (2024) and the per capita household income of the capital's population. However, due to the absence of updated municipal data for 2024, we used figures from 2023, collected by IBGE, and adjusted them for cumulative inflation up to 2024 (6.33%), based on the IPCA index. This guarantees **temporal consistency** between numerator and denominator and allows for reliable comparisons across capitals.



1 City Councilors: salary increases widened the gap



WORST IDI **Rio Branco (AC)**

R$ 1,300
Average household per capita income

R$ 18,000
City Councilor salary (2024)

BEST IDI **Vitória (ES)**

R$ 9,000
City Councilor salary (2024)

R$ 3,700
Average household per capita income

Seventeen Brazilian capitals approved **salary increases** that took effect starting in 2025. We did not consider the adjusted values in this index for methodological reasons already explained (see p. 5). However, these changes are likely to substantially raise disparity levels in the next evaluation cycles in these cities.

In Rio Branco (AC), city councilors earn more than 12 times the average income of the local population.

This underscores the importance of **regularly monitoring the IDI** and shows that the currently low disparity does not necessarily represent a more contained institutional structure — it may simply reflect a temporary lag in salary increases.

The gap persists even in higher-income cities

Capitals in the **North and Northeast concentrate the highest IDI values**, partly because they have lower average incomes, but also because they maintain reference salaries equal to or close to those in Southeast and South capitals, where the cost of living is higher.

The most concerning finding, however, is that even in cities with moderate or high average incomes — such as São Paulo (5.47) or Curitiba (5.80) — councilors still earn up to five times the average income of the population, which means institutional detachment persists even in **more prosperous contexts**.

For comparison, a **New York City councilor** (USA) has an IDI of only **2.93**, lower than that of all Brazilian capitals (except Vitória). This shows that even in major global urban centers, parliamentary pay can be more proportional to the income of the population.

New York City councilors have a **lower IDI** than **25 Brazilian capitals**, earning just 3x the local average income.

São Paulo (SP) city councilors earn **5x more** than the local average income (R$ 3,200) — among the highest in Brazil.

2 **Mayors**: cases of proximity show that a new logic is possible



Porto Alegre and Vitória set a good example

Amid a general scenario of disparity, some Brazilian capitals show mayoral IDI levels that approach international standards. The cities of Vitória and Porto Alegre maintain **indexes lower than that of New York City** (USA), proving it is possible to combine municipal leadership with compensation that is proportional to the reality of the population.

The Cost of the Judiciary

When pay tips the scales of justice

We close the Income Disparity Index with one of the most revealing and sensitive findings: the inequality between the earnings of Brazil's judicial elite and the population that, in theory, is protected by its decisions.

The survey reveals that **the judiciary is the worst case of disparity among all authorities** — not only in Brazil, but also when compared with judges of high courts in developed countries.

0,3%

Share of permanent civil servants earning above the constitutional salary ceiling (PNAD 2023).

1 The ceiling that became the floor:
the distortion of allowances and bonuses.

A ceiling that doubles in size

- R$ 2k

National per capita household income

R$ 44k

Constitutional ceiling for salaries (2024)

R$ 88k

Maximum pay allowed by the CNJ above the ceiling

Any analysis of judicial pay in Brazil must begin with the phenomenon that tore apart the Constitution to place the judiciary above the law: **allowances and bonuses** — supposedly "compensatory payments" which, in practice, dismantled the constitutional salary ceiling.

At the **federal level**, judges of the higher courts receive gross monthly salaries of around R$ 46,000, while federal judges and federal prosecutors earn close to R$ 37,000.

R$ 678 k

is how much some judges received in a single month in 2024.

339x the average Brazilian per capita household income.

An IDI above 300 has not been identified in **any other country** included in our research for this edition of the Index.

Considering only the constitutional salary (R$ 37,731.80 per month), the IDI of federal judges is 18.24. However, after the CNJ authorized allowances and bonuses of up to R$ 46,300 per month — raising the potential paycheck to R$ 84,000 — **the real IDI jumped to 40.63**, more than double the previous figure and almost four times the international average.



IDI of Supreme Courts

Comparison with some developed countries

A Power above all?

Salary inequality in the Brazilian judiciary reveals not only a structure of privileges but also an institutional model that shields itself against adjustments, revisions, or fiscal restraint. **The constitutional ceiling is, in practice, a fiction**. Careers are long, benefits are incorporated, and oversight mechanisms are fragile.

A serious reform of the judiciary must not only review the official salary, but above all, **halt the flow of allowances and bonuses** that disconnect judicial pay from the country's economic reality.

The comparison reinforces a structural point: in Brazil, the Judiciary is remunerated not only above the population but **above the public elite of other countries**. More than an issue of absolute value, the problem lies in the absence of objective and proportional pay criteria — and in the system's incapacity to contain its own privileges.

Conclusion

Rafael Moredo
Public Policy Coordinator at Livres

The Income Disparity Index (IDI) reveals, based on concrete data and international comparisons, a clear diagnosis: the Brazilian State compensates its representatives and leaders in a way that is profoundly **detached from the socioeconomic reality** of the population it is supposed to represent.

The survey carried out in 2025 identified systematic disparities across all levels of government and branches of the Republic.

This distance between representatives and the represented is **not just a budgetary issue**: it is an institutional, political, and symbolic problem. When those who make the laws, judge the rules, or execute public policies live in a financial reality radically different from that of the majority of the population, the State's ability to understand, respond to, and be accountable for society's demands is seriously compromised.

Proposals to Reduce Institutional Disparity

Drawing on international experience and the distortions identified throughout this study, the IDI also serves as a starting point for **recommendations of administrative reforms and legal frameworks capable of containing salary disparity between State and society**. Below we present possible paths:

Federative ceiling proportional to local income

Salaries of state and municipal authorities should be limited based on the per capita household income of the represented population. A **fixed index**, such as 10 or 12 times that income, could set a fair limit adapted to the reality of each state or municipality. In addition, this would create a clear incentive for the elite to focus on raising the income of the population they represent.

Prohibition of automatic indexation across branches and careers

Salary increases granted to Supreme Court justices, for example, should not trigger automatic raises in state legislatures or the Public Prosecutor's Office.

The logic of "institutional isonomy" must be replaced by one of "socioeconomic proportionality."

Independent public pay councils

Inspired by models such as the United Kingdom's Senior Salaries Review Body (SSRB), this body would be responsible for proposing **pay limits based on fiscal indicators**, productivity, and population income — free from the direct influence of the beneficiaries themselves.

Mandatory monthly transparency and control of allowances and bonuses

All additional payments that make up total compensation must be published individually and counted within the constitutional ceiling. Today, "allowances and bonuses" function as a mechanism for salary expansion without social oversight.

Inclusion of the IDI as an official monitoring tool

The IDI could be adopted by oversight and policy bodies (such as TCU, CGU, STN, and Ipea) as an indicator of institutional fairness, alongside the Gini coefficient, tax burden, and other State evaluation metrics.

A Democratic Imperative

Mano Ferreira
Co-founder and Director of Operations at Livres

Liberal democracy requires much more than periodic elections. It demands accountability, transparency, and above all, representativeness. When those at the top of the State disconnect from the population's reality, public trust in institutions collapses and legitimacy is put at risk.

The Income Disparity Index (IDI) is a tool that makes it possible to measure this phenomenon objectively, comparing it with international realities and shedding light on ways to **reform rules that perpetuate institutional inequalities** deeply rooted in Brazil.

The IDI highlights a structural problem: Brazil's state elite is frequently remunerated in ways that are disproportionate to the rest of society — something not explained solely by economic factors or the country's low average income. It is a **patrimonialist and dysfunctional** State model, with little transparency and virtually no effective control over high-level salary adjustments.

While consolidated democracies impose institutional limits on the discretion of authorities, Brazil still allows salary increases to be set by the very beneficiaries, without connection to productivity, institutional performance, fiscal responsibility, or the social and economic reality of the country.

This logic is typical of **extractive institutions**, which lead nations to failure. They concentrate power and wealth in a small elite, extracting resources from the majority of the population. A State that deepens inequality, undermines public trust, and erodes the legitimacy of democracy.

For Brazil to be a decent country, we must reform the State to serve the citizen.

The opposite is **inclusive institutions**, which place limits on power, multiply opportunities, and promote shared prosperity. Reforming extractive institutions to make them more connected to citizenship and guided by effective outcomes of social justice is the challenge of our generation.

Measuring disparity between representatives and the represented is the first step toward reducing it. By doing so with data, methodology, and international comparisons, **the IDI not only exposes but also proposes** — pointing to paths for building a fairer, more efficient, and freer country.

For Brazil to be a decent country, we must reform the State to serve the citizen. This is not a utopia or an ideological whim. It is a democratic imperative.

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Coalition Against Supersalaries

Livres is part of a coalition of civil society organizations working to improve public spending efficiency and ensure fair compensation in the Brazilian State. This coalition seeks to eliminate salaries above the constitutional ceiling by proposing technical and legislative solutions to guarantee a fairer, more transparent, and more sustainable public service.

Coalition members include:

- Associação Livres
- Centro de Liderança Pública
- Fundação Tide Setubal
- Instituto Democracia e Sustentabilidade
- Movimento Brasil Competitivo
- Movimento Pessoas à Frente
- Pacto Nacional pelo Combate às Desigualdades
- Plataforma Justa
- República.org
- Transparência Brasil

To defend a fairer and more efficient State, the Coalition launched in April 2025 the Manifesto for the End of Supersalaries, accessible via the QR Code below.

Project Liberal Democracy

eusoulivres.org/**democracialiberal**

The **Liberal Democracy project**, led by Livres, promotes institutional reforms that put the State at the service of citizens. By combating privileges and strengthening republican principles, it seeks to reduce distortions such as those revealed by the Income Disparity Index, bringing representatives closer to the population.

In this context, the initiative **Spending Review** complements this effort by defending a fairer and more efficient budget, revising expenditures to prioritize those who need it most. By exposing salary inequalities in the public sector, as the IDI does, it reinforces the need to spend better in order to build a freer and more prosperous country.

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Support **liberal solutions** for Brazil. Join Livres.

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eusou**livres**.org @eusoulivres